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THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: APPLYING THE 
EXCEPTION TO EMPLOYEES WHO MINISTER 
Maria Ruwe 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to religious freedom is widely endorsed throughout the 
United States. One way that religious freedom is protected is through a 
constitutional doctrine called the “ministerial exception.” The ministerial 
exception allows religious organizations to hire and fire their employees 
who qualify as “ministers” without abiding by antidiscrimination laws.1   
The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in 2012.2 In so 
holding, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional legitimacy of the 
ministerial exception. However, the Supreme Court did not offer a bright-
line test that lower courts could apply when classifying religious 
organizations’ employees. As a result of the Supreme Court’s narrow and 
undefined holding, the circuit courts have been inconsistent in their 
application of the ministerial exception.  
This Article will explain the origin and parameters of the ministerial 
exception, describe the Supreme Court’s approach in applying the 
exception, discuss some of the circuit courts’ inconsistencies regarding 
the exception, and specify why courts should use a functional approach 
when classifying the employees of religious organizations. First, Section 
II of this Article will provide the background of the ministerial exception, 
including a summary of the courts’ creation and development of the 
exception. Next, Section III will explain why both the approach and 
conclusion in Biel v. St. James Catholic School3 were inaccurate. Section 
III will continue with an explanation about why courts should use a 
functional approach when classifying employees of religious 
organizations. Finally, Section IV will conclude by touching on the 
possible consequences that might result from future courts applying the 
functional approach to the ministerial exception.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
 
 1. Michael J. West, Note, Waiving the Ministerial Exception, 103 VA. L. REV. 1861, 1864-65 
(2017). 
 2. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).  
 3. 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”4 Generally, the First Amendment 
provides religious organizations with the “power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as 
well as those of faith and doctrine.”5 Simply put, the government may not 
regulate religious beliefs.6 The ministerial exception is a constitutional 
doctrine that bars religious “ministers” from bringing employment 
discrimination claims against the religious organizations that employ 
them.7 This exception is rooted in the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.8   
This Section will first explain the constitutional basis for the ministerial 
exception. Next, this Section addresses the origin of the ministerial 
exception in the courts and the Supreme Court’s application of the 
exception. Finally, this Section concludes with an analysis of how some 
federal circuit courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s application of 
the ministerial exception.  
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from singling out 
areligious organization for adverse treatment.9 This constitutional clause 
gives individuals the right to worship how they want without fearing 
governmental intervention.10 In the context of the ministerial exception, 
the Supreme Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause protects a 
religious organization’s right to “shape its own faith and mission through 
its appointments.”11 Further, the Court has noted that a religious 
organization’s freedom to select its clergy receives constitutional 
protection due to a religious organization’s freedom to exercise its 
religion without state interference.12 Indeed, a religious organization must 
be free to choose its ministers using any criteria that it wants.13  
The Free Exercise Clause reserves “special solicitude” for the church-
minister relationship.14 A religious organization’s choice about who 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 5. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of The Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).  
 6. Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent 
Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944 (1986).  
 7. West, supra note 1, at 1864-65.   
 8. Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1776 (2008).  
 9. Choper, supra note 6, at 956. 
 10. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU L. 
REV. 755, 756 (2001).    
 11. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).   
 12. Note, supra note 8, at 1780.  
 13. West, supra note 1, at 1900.  
 14. Note, supra note 8, at 1776.  
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qualifies as a minister is a “unique distillation of a belief system.”15 
Regulating the choice of who may serve as a religious organization’s 
minister comes perilously close to regulating belief, which is strictly 
forbidden by Free Exercise rights.16 
B. The Establishment Clause 
The Establishment Clause prevents Congress from enacting any law 
“respecting an establishment of religion.”17 The purpose of the 
Establishment Clause is to prevent the government from promoting or 
discouraging religious worship or belief18 and from entangling itself with 
religion.19 
The Establishment Clause has been interpreted in two ways.20 First, the 
provision may be construed as a structural restraint on the government’s 
power to legislate in the religious realm.21 Under this reading, the 
Establishment Clause is analogous to a physical wall that separates the 
church and the State.22 In other words, the church and State are two 
completely distinct sovereigns, and the government simply may not 
legislate in this area.23 
Second, the Establishment Clause may be interpreted as protecting the 
liberty of conscience.24 Under this interpretation, the provision prohibits 
governmental involvement in ecclesiastical decisions so as to prevent the 
government’s judgment from replacing the religious organization’s 
decisions.25 This interpretation holds that a religious organization must 
have independence and freedom over its internal, religious choices.26  
C. Antidiscrimination Laws in Employment 
The Americans with Disabilities Act,27 the Age Discrimination in 
 
 15. Id. at 1780.  
 16. Id.  
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 18. West, supra note 1, at 1895.   
 19. Russell W. Galloway, Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845, 
845 (1989).  
 20. West, supra note 1, at 1869.   
 21. Id.  
 22. Galloway, supra note 19, at 845.  
 23. West, supra note 1, at 1869-70.   
 24. Id. at 1869.  
 25. Id. at 1894. 
 26. Id. at 1868-69.   
 27. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2020) (protects 
individuals who suffer from long-term physical or mental disabilities from discrimination based on 
disability). 
3
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Employment Act,28 and the Family Medical Leave Act29 are examples of 
some federal employment and antidiscrimination laws that affect 
employers.30 In addition, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.31 However, Title VII does permit a religious 
employer to prefer members of its own faith for employment, but leaves 
the employer liable for discriminating based on other protected 
classifications.32 
D. The Ministerial Exception 
The ministerial exception encompasses the collision of religious liberty 
and employment antidiscrimination laws.33 The exception allows 
religious employers to hire and fire their ministerial employees without 
abiding by antidiscrimination laws.34 For the ministerial exception to 
apply, two conditions must be met: (1) the employer must be a religious 
organization and (2) the employee at issue must be a ministerial 
employee.35 When religious employers discriminate based on a 
classification protected by federal law, the interests between religious 
freedom and civil rights clash.36 When this happens,  courts generally 
apply strict scrutiny37 to the antidiscrimination law, weighing the 
religious organization’s38 interest in the unburdened selection of its 
spiritual leaders against the government’s interest in enforcing 
antidiscrimination laws.39 However, even though courts have recognized 
 
 28. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2020) (protects 
individuals over the age of forty from discrimination based on age).  
 29. See Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2020) (enables individuals 
to take leave after the birth or adoption of a child, to care for the health of an immediate family member, 
or to care for their own health).  
 30. Overview of Employment and Anti-Discrimination Laws, FINDLAW (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://employment.findlaw.com/employment-discrimination/overview-of-employment-and-anti-
discrimination-laws.html.  
 31. Note, supra note 8, at 1777.  
 32. Id. at 1777-78.  
 33. Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2011).  
 34. West, supra note 1, at 1864-65.  
 35. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 36. Note, supra note 8, at 1776.   
 37. “Strict scrutiny” requires the state to show “a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates 
the law in question.” Strict Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 38. There is no precise definition for what constitutes a “religious organization.” Previously, in 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the Supreme Court denied the distinction 
made by the NLRB between organizations that are “completely religious” and those that are merely 
“religiously associated.” See Francesca M. Genova, Labor in Faith: A Comparative Analysis of Hosanna-
Tabor v. EEOC Through the European Court of Human Rights’ Religious Employer Jurisprudence, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 444 (2014).   
 39. Note, supra note 8, at 1780.  
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the vital importance of preventing workplace discrimination, courts 
routinely place the protection of religious freedom over the prevention of 
an infringement on civil rights.40 Religious employers may affirmatively 
defend against a discrimination employment action by invoking the 
ministerial exception.41 
The ministerial exception was first formally recognized in McClure v. 
Salvation Army.42 After the Salvation Army terminated a female 
employee, she sued, alleging a violation of Title VII.43 Neither party 
disputed that the employee, who was an ordained minister of the faith, 
was a “minister engaged in the religious or ecclesiastical activities of the 
church.”44 The court therefore found that the employee could be 
terminated for any reason without violating Title VII because Congress 
never intended to regulate the employment relationship between a 
religious organization and its ministers.45 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit 
noted: “The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is 
its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church 
seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must 
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”46  
In 1985, in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 
the Fourth Circuit also recognized the ministerial exception.47 Rooting the 
exception in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the court 
extended the ministerial exception to an employee who was not an 
ordained minister, but was an “associate in pastoral care” at a church.48 
The court held that the ministerial exception does not depend on the 
employee’s ordination, but rather on the employee’s function.49 In this 
case, the employee was “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of 
the church” and performed duties that consisted of “teaching, spreading 
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or 
 
 40. Id. at 1780-81. See also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 
1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (“While an unfettered church choice might create minimal infidelity to the 
objectives of Title VII, it provides maximum protection of the First Amendment right to the free exercise 
of religious beliefs”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (holding 
that some religious interests are so important that no compelling state interest can justify the government 
intrusion); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“In the absence of fraud, 
collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, 
although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because 
the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.”). 
 41. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,195 n.4 (2012).  
 42. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 43. Id. at 555.  
 44. Id. at 556.  
 45. Id. at 560-61.  
 46. Id. at 558-59.  
 47. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 48. Id. at 1168-70.  
 49. Id. at 1168-69.  
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supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.”50 Therefore, 
the court classified the employee as a minister for the purposes of the 
exception.51 The Rayburn court also noted that an inquiry into whether 
the employee’s position is important to the mission of the religious 
organization is necessary, but a court may not investigate into whether the 
reason for the adverse employment action was grounded in theological 
belief.52  
Courts continued to expand the ministerial exception, applying it to 
most class-based protections under Title VII,53 other federal employment 
discrimination statutes, and some state law claims—such as defamation 
and breach of contract.54 In such cases, the courts held that the exception 
applies to any claim by a ministerial employee where a court would have 
to resolve specifically religious questions about an employee’s 
performance in an employment position.55 In coming to these 
conclusions, courts have defined “ministers” as employees who perform 
significant religious duties for their religious organization employers.56 
The Fifth Circuit defined what generally constitutes religious duties: 
Generally, “if the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, 
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, 
or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she 
should be considered ‘clergy.’”57 
1. Reason Behind the Adverse Employment Action 
If a religious organization’s employee can be classified as a minister, 
courts may not inquire into the reason behind the adverse employment 
decision.58 The rationale behind this principle is that religious 
organizations need the freedom to choose who will preach their beliefs, 
convey their faith, and carry out their mission.59 Such an inquiry would 
require a court to judge a religious organization’s doctrines, which could 
 
 50. Id. at 1168-69.  
 51. Id. at 1169. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Courts have never applied the ministerial exception to claims related to sexual harassment. See 
Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1847, 1853 (2018). 
 54. Id. at 1853-54. 
 55. Id. at 1854. 
 56. Lund, supra note 33, at 21. 
 57. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical 
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)). 
 58. Failure to hire and termination both constitute an adverse employment action.  
 59. Francesca M. Genova, Labor in Faith: A Comparative Analysis of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC 
Through the European Court of Human Rights’ Religious Employer Jurisprudence, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 419, 446 (2014).   
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jeopardize religious autonomy because a court would ultimately have to 
decide what the accused religious organization really believes and how 
important that belief is to the organization’s overall mission.60 This is 
problematic because evaluating a religious organization’s beliefs can 
violate the Establishment Clause.61  
In most Title VII cases, courts engage in a pretext inquiry regarding the 
employer’s stated legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.62 
However, the Supreme Court has clarified that a plaintiff-minister who 
asserts that a religious organization’s adverse employment action was 
pretextual “misses the point of the ministerial exception.”63 Rather, “[t]he 
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a 
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead 
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister . . . is the 
church’s alone.”64 
2. The Effect of Employment Division Department of Human Resources 
v. Smith on the Ministerial Exception 
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division Department 
of Human Resources v. Smith,65 which limited the scope of the Free 
Exercise Clause.66 In Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause 
is not a defense to those who violate neutral and generally applicable laws, 
even when their actions are based on religious belief.67 Although some 
questioned whether the ministerial exception would survive the strict 
limitation on religious exemptions articulated in Smith, the D.C. Circuit 
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America held that Smith did not modify 
the ministerial exception.68 According to the court in Catholic University 
of America, Smith implicated religious protection for individuals, not 
religious organizations.69   
Although Smith did not alter the ministerial exception, Smith still 
implicated the exception because employment discrimination statutes are 
almost always facially neutral and generally applicable.70 In response to 
Smith, courts did not limit the ministerial exception, but rather expanded 
the Establishment Clause, which shifted the focus from the religious 
 
 60. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 205-06 (2012).  
 61. Genova, supra note 59, at 443-44. 
 62. See Sterlinksi v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 934 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2019).  
 63. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 174.  
 64. Id.   
 65. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 66. West, supra note 1, at 1866. 
 67. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.  
 68. 83 F.3d 455, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 69. Id. at 462.    
 70. West, supra note 1, at 1866. 
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organizations to the courts.71 Rather than concentrating on rights vested 
in religious organizations, the focus shifted to the courts’ inherent 
inability to decide religious questions.72 Smith does not impede a religious 
organization’s ability to determine who is a minister because the 
Establishment Clause—not the Free Exercise Clause—prevents courts’ 
involvement in religious matters.73 
3. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC 
In 2012, the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception for 
the first time in Hosanna-Tabor.74 Prior to 2012, every federal circuit and 
several state supreme courts had recognized the existence of the 
ministerial exception,75 and most federal circuits had extended the 
exception beyond merely heads of religious congregations.76 Although 
the Supreme Court agreed that the ministerial exception existed, the Court 
declined to adopt a “rigid formula” for deciding whether an employee 
qualifies as a minister.77  
In Hosanna-Tabor, the employee, Cheryl Perich, was a “called 
teacher” and a “commissioned minister” at a Lutheran church and 
school.78 Perich taught a religion class four days a week, led students in 
daily prayer and devotional exercises, and attended a weekly school-wide 
chapel service.79 After Perich took disability leave due to narcolepsy, the 
church did not renew her contract.80 As a result, the EEOC sued Hosanna-
Tabor Church, alleging a violation of the ADA.81 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the employee was not a minister for the purposes of the exception.82 
In overruling the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Court noted three errors 
made by the lower court.83 First, the Sixth Circuit considered the 
employee’s status of commissioned minister as immaterial to the 
employee’s ministerial classification.84 Although an employee’s title by 
itself does not automatically make someone a minister, an employee’s 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1866-67. 
 74. 565 U.S. 171, 173 (2012). 
 75. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 53, at 1851. 
 76. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.  
 77. Id. at 173.   
 78. Id. at 177-78.   
 79. Id. at 178. 
 80. Id. at 178-79.  
 81. Id. at 180.  
 82. Id. at 181.  
 83. Id. at 192-94.  
 84. Id. at 192-93.  
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title, religious training, and mission underlying that title are all relevant.85 
Second, the Court noted that the Sixth Circuit overemphasized the fact 
that “lay” teachers at the school performed the same duties as the 
employee.86 Finally, the Sixth Circuit overstated the substantial secular 
duties that the employee performed.87 Because even heads of 
congregations perform both religious and secular duties, the Court held 
that this consideration was not determinative of the employee’s 
classification.88 
In deciding that Perich was a minister, the Court took a fact-based 
approach that examined all the circumstances surrounding the 
employment.89 Four considerations dominated the court’s analysis: (1) 
the formal title that the church had bestowed on the employee; (2) the 
substance reflected in the title; (3) the employee’s own use of the title; 
and (4) the important religious functions that the employee performed.90 
The Court rooted its decision in the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses, although the Establishment Clause was more prevalent.91 The 
Court justified the exception itself on the proposition that some questions 
are outside the government’s authority to decide.92 Therefore, the 
exception rests on the recognition that the government is specifically 
limited in resolving certain ecclesiastical matters, not on a broad freedom 
for religious organizations.93 Although the interests of the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause sometimes overlap, the 
Establishment Clause imposes the primary justification for the ministerial 
exception, as articulated by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor.94  
i. Distinguishing Hosanna-Tabor from Smith 
The Court’s holding in Hosanna-Tabor granted greater protection for 
religious organizations than for religious individuals.95 The Court 
distinguished its decision in Hosanna-Tabor from Smith by noting that a 
religious organization’s selection of its ministers differs from an 
individual’s ingestion of peyote.96 Specifically, Smith involved 
 
 85. Id. at 193.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.   
 88. Id. at 193-94.  
 89. Id. at 190.  
 90. Id. at 191-92.  
 91. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 53, at 1857. 
 92. Id. at 1862.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Carolina Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School 
v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 955 (2011).  
 96. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012). 
9
Ruwe: The Functional Approach to the Ministerial Exception
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
214 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
government regulation of only outward physical acts while the 
antidiscrimination employment laws implicated governmental 
interference with an internal church decision that affected the faith and 
mission of the church itself.97 Even the Court in Smith itself noted that the 
government could regulate physical acts but could not empower “one or 
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”98  
ii. Concurring Opinions in Hosanna-Tabor 
Justices Alito and Kagan concurred in Hosanna-Tabor, clarifying that 
the term “minister” or the concept of ordination should not be viewed as 
determining factors when classifying religious employees for purposes of 
the exception.99 Rather, according to Justices Alito and Kagan, courts 
should focus on the function performed by the employee.100 Further, the 
Justices noted that the ministerial exception should be tailored to the 
purpose of the First Amendment, which is to protect the key religious 
activities of conducting religious rituals and communicating the 
organization’s faith.101 Consequently, the Justices asserted that religious 
organizations must be free to choose the personnel who are essential to 
the performance of these functions.102  
Justices Alito and Kagan also noted that the First Amendment allows 
religious organizations to freely govern themselves according to their 
own beliefs and to choose who may serve in positions of substantial 
religious importance.103 While acknowledging the different views among 
the different religions about what constitutes substantial religious 
importance, Justices Alito and Kagan identified some general categories 
of employees that are essential to almost every religious organization: 
those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform important 
functions in worship services and religious ceremonies, and those who 
teach the faith to others.104 The Justices explained that applying the 
ministerial exception to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and 
expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for the 
autonomy of any religious organization.105 The concurring opinion 
emphasized that virtually every religious organization exists to 
collectively express and propagate its religious ideals, and that the 
 
 97. Id.   
 98. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).  
 99. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 199.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 199-200.  
 104. Id. at 200.  
 105. Id.  
10
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character and conduct of the teachers can greatly affect the content and 
credibility of a religion’s message.106  
Additionally, Justices Alito and Kagan pointed out that several federal 
circuits have reached a consensus that a functional approach should be 
employed when applying the ministerial exception.107 Notably, their 
concurring opinion emphasized that “[t]he Court’s opinion today should 
not be read to upset this consensus.”108 Finally, the Justices’ main reason 
for classifying the employee in Hosanna-Tabor as a minister was because 
the employee played the essential role of “conveying the Church’s 
message and carrying out its mission.”109 
Justice Thomas separately concurred in Hosanna-Tabor, expressing 
the view that courts should accept, without further inquiry, a religious 
organizations’ sincere assertion about an employee’s status.110 
Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that the courts should “defer to a 
religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its 
minister. . . . A religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would 
be hollow, however, if secular courts could second-guess the 
organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’ 
under the organization’s theological tenets.”111 Further, Justice Thomas 
argued that a religious organization should not have to conform its beliefs 
and practices to the prevailing secular understanding of who should 
qualify as a minister.112 Justice Thomas supported  this argument by 
quoting the Court’s decision in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos113: “[I]t is a 
significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of 
substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will 
consider religious.”114   
4. After Hosanna-Tabor 
Since 2012, several federal circuit courts have attempted to apply the 
Hosanna-Tabor decision in cases involving the ministerial exception. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit classified a Catholic church’s music director as 
a minister because the director performed an important function during 
the service and “played a role in furthering the mission of the church and 
 
 106. Id. at 200-01.  
 107. Id. at 202-04.  
 108. Id. at 204.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 196-97.  
 111. Id. at 196-97 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 112. Id. at 197.  
 113. 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987).  
 114. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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conveying its message to congregants.”115 The Fifth Circuit supported 
this classification by noting that the religious organization should be able 
to determine who participates in its religious ceremonies.116 
In a 2018 decision, Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, the 
Seventh Circuit found that a Hebrew teacher qualified as a “minister” by 
applying the fact-intensive analysis articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.117 
Specifically, the court found that the teacher’s role in instructing the 
students about Judaism, the school’s motivation for hiring her, and her 
role in furthering the school’s religious mission demonstrated that the 
Hebrew teacher was a “minister” of the religious organization.118 
Applying the four considerations from Hosanna-Tabor, the court found 
that the first factor—the teacher’s title—disfavored applying the 
ministerial exception because the teacher was identified as a “grade 
school teacher.”119 Second, the teacher’s use of her title disfavored the 
use of the exception because the teacher never presented herself to the 
public as an ambassador of Judaism.120 Third, the substance of the 
teacher’s title favored applying the exception because the teacher 
incorporated religious teachings into her lessons and the school hired her, 
in part, because of her past religious teaching experience.121 Finally, the 
teacher’s important religious function favored applying the exception.122 
The teacher taught about the Jewish faith, conducted weekly Torah 
readings, and prayed and performed certain rituals with her students.123 
By looking at all the factors, the court found that the teacher’s 
employment claim—based on her allegedly unlawful discriminatory 
termination—must be dismissed due to her classification as a minister.124   
5. Biel v. St. James School 
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit decided Biel v. St. James School.125 In that 
case, a fifth-grade teacher, Kristen Biel, at St. James Catholic School 
informed the school that she had cancer and would have to take disability 
leave.126 After the school failed to renew Biel’s contract, she sued, 
 
 115. Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012).   
 116. Id. at 180.  
 117. 882 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2018).  
 118. Id. at 657.  
 119. Id. at 659.  
 120. Id.   
 121. Id. at 659-60.  
 122. Id. at 660. 
 123. Id.   
 124. Id. at 661-62.  
 125. 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 126. Id. at 605.  
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alleging an ADA violation.127 The Ninth Circuit held that the teacher was 
not a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.128  
Biel taught the fifth graders all of their academic subjects, including a 
standard religion curriculum from a school-prescribed workbook on the 
Catholic faith for about thirty minutes each day, four days a week.129 Biel 
joined—but did not lead—her students in prayers twice a day.130 She also 
attended monthly Mass with her students, where her “sole responsibility 
was to keep her class quiet and orderly.”131 
Biel’s contract specified that she would work within St. James’s 
overriding commitment to Church doctrines, laws, and norms and would 
“model, teach, and promote behavior in conformity to the teaching of the 
Roman Catholic Church.”132 St. James’s mission statement stated that the 
school strives to develop “confident, competent, and caring Catholic-
Christian citizens prepared to be responsible members of their church[,] 
local[,] and global communities.”133 The school’s faculty handbook 
provided that St. James’s teachers must participate in the Church’s 
mission of educating students academically and in the Catholic faith and 
values.134 Further, the handbook instructs teachers to follow both 
archdiocesan curricula guidelines and California’s public-school 
curricula requirements.135 
 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged a religious organization’s broad 
right to choose its own leaders, and that St. James indisputably qualified 
as a religious organization.136 The only dispute was whether Biel should 
be classified as a “minister” for the purposes of the exception.137 The 
Ninth Circuit examined the four considerations that the Court had 
discussed in Hosanna-Tabor and concluded that Biel was not a “minister” 
for the purposes of the ministerial exception.138   
First, Biel’s formal title did not suggest any special expertise in Church 
doctrine, values, or pedagogy beyond that of a practicing Catholic.139 Her 
title was “Grade 5 teacher,” which conveyed no religious meaning.140  
 
 127. Id. at 606.  
 128. Id. at 605.  
 129. Id.   
 130. Id.   
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 605-06.  
 135. Id. at 606. 
 136. Id. at 606-07.  
 137. Id. at 607.  
 138. Id. at 608-10.   
 139. Id. at 608.  
 140. Id.  
13
Ruwe: The Functional Approach to the Ministerial Exception
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
218 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
Second, Biel had no ministerial background, and there was no religious 
component to her educational degree or teaching credentials.141 Also, St. 
James required no religious training for the position of fifth-grade 
teacher.142 Even after Biel began work, her religious training was limited 
to a single half-day conference that contained barely any religious 
substance.143 Further, it appeared that Biel did not consider teaching at 
the Catholic school to be a calling, but instead took work wherever she 
could find it.144 For example, she had previously worked for a Lutheran 
school, multiple public schools, and for tutoring companies.145 
Third, Biel did not hold herself out to the public as a minister.146 She 
called herself a teacher and did not claim any benefits available only to 
ministers.147  
Fourth, Biel’s job duties included teaching religion in the classroom.148 
She incorporated religious themes and symbols into her overall classroom 
environment and curriculum, as required by the school.149 Although Biel 
likely satisfied this fourth consideration, the majority found that the 
ministerial exception should not apply based on the satisfaction of one 
factor alone.150 Otherwise, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, most of the 
analysis in Hosanna-Tabor would be “irrelevant dicta,” given that the 
employee’s didactic, religious role in Hosanna-Tabor was just one of four 
considerations that the Court relied on when deciding that the employee 
should be classified as a minister.151  
The majority distinguished its holding in Biel from other post-
Hosanna-Tabor sister circuit cases by noting that these other cases 
involved employees with pronounced religious leadership and 
guidance.152 Because Biel satisfied, at most, only one of the four 
considerations, the majority found that Biel was not a minister for 
purposes of the ministerial exception. 153 
The majority also noted that a different holding would render any 
school employee who teaches religion a minister for purposes of the 
 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 609.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 610.  
 153. Id.  
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exception.154 The majority asserted that such a rule would be unfaithful 
to Hosanna-Tabor because “it would base the exception on a single aspect 
of the employee’s role rather than on a holistic examination of her 
training, duties, title, and the extent to which she is tasked with 
transmitting religious ideas.”155 
The majority concluded by considering the purpose of the First 
Amendment and the Founders’ intent.156 Specifically, the majority noted 
that the First Amendment does not exempt employees from federal 
employment laws who do not “serve a leadership role in the faith” or those 
employees who intermingle secular and religious duties.157 Rather, 
Hosanna-Tabor protects those employees who “preach their employers’ 
beliefs, teach their faith, . . . carry out their mission . . . [and] guide their 
religious organization on its way.”158 
i. Judge Fisher’s Dissent in Biel v. St. James 
Judge Fisher wrote a lengthy dissent that specified explained why Biel 
should have been classified as a minister for the purposes of the 
ministerial exception.159 Consistent with Hosanna-Tabor, the dissent 
tried to get a “complete picture” of Biel’s role at St. James.160 For 
example, the dissent examined Biel’s employment contract, a 
performance review, and the faculty handbook.161 Also, Judge Fisher 
thoroughly analyzed each of the four considerations discussed in 
Hosanna-Tabor.162 
In analyzing the considerations laid out in Hosanna-Tabor, the dissent 
disputed the majority’s analysis as to only the second consideration—the 
substance reflected in the job title.163 The dissent argued that the 
substance reflected in a title is broader than mere educational or practical 
prerequisites.164 Buttressing this argument, the dissent noted that a 
broader interpretation encompasses certain religious organizations that do 
 
 154. Id. Interestingly, this result is exactly what Justices Alito and Kagan argued for in their 
Hosanna-Tabor concurring opinion. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171, 199 (2012) (“[The ‘ministerial’ exception] should apply to any ‘employee’ who . . . serves 
as a messenger or teacher of [a religious organization’s] faith.”).  
 155. Biel, 911 F.3d at 610.  
 156. Id. at 610-11. 
 157. Id. at 611.  
 158. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196).  
 159. Id. (Fisher, J., dissenting).  
 160. Id. at 612.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 615-20.  
 163. Id. at 616-18.  
 164. Id. at 616.  
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not require formal training for their ministers.165 Judge Fisher argued that 
this second factor should be evaluated based on how the religious 
organization understood an employee’s role.166 Here, the religious 
organization understood Biel’s role, as specified in her employment 
contract, as one who would propagate and manifest the Catholic faith in 
all aspects of teaching.167 Because the substance of Biel’s title as “Grade 
5 Teacher” encompassed the role of religion teacher,168 Judge Fisher 
argued that this factor favored classifying Biel as a minister for purposes 
of the exception.169 
The Biel dissent also mentioned Grussgott, in which the Seventh 
Circuit held that the substance underlying the employee’s title favored 
applying the exception to the Hebrew language teacher at a Jewish school, 
partly because the substance of the teacher’s title, as communicated to her 
and understood by others, entailed teaching the Jewish faith.170 Biel had 
agreed in her contract that she understood that St. James’s mission was to 
develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community within the 
philosophy of Catholic education as implemented by St. James, and the 
doctrines, law, and norms of the Catholic Church.171 For these reasons 
and all the surrounding circumstances, Judge Fisher argued that Biel, like 
the employee in Grussgott, should have been classified as a minister.172 
 
    6. Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru 
 
In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court 
noted that the four considerations in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant 
circumstances in Perich’s case, not essential, inflexible requirements.173 
Although the Court did not outright adopt the functional approach, the 
Court noted that what matters when classifying an employee “is what an 
employee does.”174 The Court held that other courts should decide 
whether the first three Hosanna-Tabor circumstances—a ministerial 
title, formal religious education, and the employee’s self-description as a 
minister—were present.175 Then, to check the conclusion suggested by 
 
 165. Id. at 616-17.  
 166. Id. at 617.   
 167. Id.  
 168. In fact, Biel was the only religion teacher that the children had.  
 169. Biel, 911 F.3d at  617-18.  
 170. Id. at 617.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 621-22.  
173 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 2068.  
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these circumstances, courts should ask whether the employee performed 
a religious function.176  
   
III. DISCUSSION 
This Section will first explain why the approach used in Biel v. St. 
James was inconsistent with the framework provided by the Supreme 
Court in Hosanna-Tabor. Namely, the Biel court misclassified a religious 
organization’s employee by requiring factual similarity between the Biel 
employee and the Hosanna-Tabor employee. This approach is misguided 
because courts should evaluate additional considerations—distinct from 
the specific employment circumstances in Hosanna-Tabor— when 
classifying employees. Additionally, such a holding could disadvantage 
religious organizations that are unlike the religious organization in 
Hosanna-Tabor. Next, this section will discuss how the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court expanded the considerations that courts should evaluate when using 
the functional approach to classify a religious organization’s employee. 
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, most circuit courts used the functional approach 
when classifying religious organization’s employees. But the functional 
approach was limited to focusing on the employee’s job duties. In 
Hosanna-Tabor, the Court examined all the circumstances surrounding 
the employment when determining whether the employee functioned as a 
minister, rather than solely considering the employee’s duties. Finally, 
this section will conclude by explaining why this modified functional 
approach comports with the purposes of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.   
A. In Biel v. St. James, when determining whether the plaintiff was a 
“minister,” the Ninth Circuit evaluated only the four considerations 
examined in Hosanna-Tabor rather than exploring all the circumstances 
surrounding the plaintiff’s employment. 
In Biel v. St. James, the Ninth Circuit improperly applied the four 
Hosanna-Tabor considerations—the employee’s formal title, the 
substance underlying the title, the employee’s use of the title, and the 
employee’s function—as factors that form a rigid test. Specifically, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the employee did not qualify as a minister 
because “[a]t most, only one of the four Hosanna-Tabor considerations” 
favored classifying the employee as such.177 However, in Hosanna-
Tabor, the Court explicitly rejected adopting a rigid test when classifying 
 
176 Id. 
 177. Id. at 610.  
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a religious organization’s employee for purposes of the ministerial 
exception.178 By requiring that at least two of the Hosanna-Tabor 
considerations be met before the ministerial exception may apply, the 
court in Biel adopted a rigid test to classify the employee, which wholly 
contradicted the holding in Hosanna-Tabor. 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court did not refer to the employee’s formal title, 
the substance underlying that title, the employee’s use of that title, or the 
function performed by the employee as factors, but simply as 
“considerations.” Nor did the Court state that these considerations 
composed a multi-factor balancing analysis. In fact, in his concurring 
opinion, Justice Thomas stated: “Judicial attempts to fashion a civil 
definition of ‘minister’ through a bright-line test or multifactor analysis 
risk disadvantaging those religious organizations whose beliefs, practices, 
and membership are outside of the mainstream or unpalatable to some.”179 
The considerations in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant for one specific 
employee at a Lutheran church. In cases involving different types of 
employees and different religious organizations, courts must analyze 
different considerations when determining an employee’s ministerial 
classification. 
To illustrate, the considerations for an employee of a Buddhist 
organization may drastically differ from those for an employee of a 
Lutheran church. For example, an employee’s informal title, the 
employee’s handbook or employment contract, the religious 
organization’s mission, whether the employer’s hiring process included 
religious criteria,180 and the religious organization’s expectation or 
understanding of the employee’s role181 may all be relevant 
considerations when classifying certain employees. The considerations 
that are relevant to the classification of a religious organization’s 
employees are endless due to the wide range of differing religious 
organizations and the differing roles within each organization.  
The Hosanna-Tabor Court did not begin with the four considerations 
and discuss whether the employee satisfied each consideration. Rather, 
the Court derived the considerations from a single employment 
circumstance. Different considerations may have emerged if a different 
type of employee or a different religious organization were at issue.  
Additionally, Biel’s interpretation of Hosanna-Tabor inaccurately 
conveyed that the ministerial exception applies only to cases that are 
factually similar to Hosanna-Tabor. Specifically, the Biel court declined 
to classify the employee as a minister because the case bore “so little 
 
 178. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,173 (2012).  
 179. Id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 180. See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 181. See Biel, 911 F.3d at 617 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  
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resemblance to Hosanna-Tabor.”182 This conclusion is misguided 
because the Hosanna-Tabor Court never required factual similarity to 
Perich’s circumstances in order for a court to classify an employee as a 
minister. Rather, the Court narrowly held that the employee in Hosanna-
Tabor was a minister given all the circumstances of her individual 
employment. This suggests that the correct approach for lower courts is 
to first examine all the circumstances of the individual’s employment and 
then determine whether the employee is a minister—that is, whether the 
employee plays a role in preaching or teaching the organization’s beliefs 
and carrying out its mission—based on the employee’s circumstances.  
Even using the four Hosanna-Tabor considerations as general 
guideposts approaches the question from the wrong direction. In 
Hosanna-Tabor, the Court first examined the employee’s circumstances, 
and then extracted the relevant considerations from those particular 
circumstances. Although courts may still arrive at the correct holding, 
courts that use the Hosanna-Tabor considerations as general guideposts 
employ a misguided approach. For example, in Grussgott v. Milwaukee 
Jewish Day School,183 the Seventh Circuit began its analysis for 
classifying a Jewish school’s Hebrew teacher by examining each 
Hosanna-Tabor consideration and considering the similarities between 
the Jewish teacher and the Hosanna-Tabor employee.184 Because the 
employee’s circumstances favored applying the exception, the Grussgott 
court held that the Hebrew teacher qualified as a minister.185 Although 
the court ultimately was correct in classifying the Hebrew teacher as a 
minister, the court used a backwards approach to arrive at this holding.   
B. Courts should employ a functional approach when determining the 
classification of a religious organization’s employee. 
Courts should use a functional approach when classifying a religious 
organization’s employee for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court in 
Hosanna-Tabor essentially used a functional approach when applying the 
ministerial exception, and lower courts should follow that lead. Second, a 
functional approach facilitates the true purposes of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses.  
The functional approach focuses on the function performed by an 
employee of a religious organization.186 Before Hosanna-Tabor was 
 
 182. Id. at 610.  
 183. 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018).  
 184. Id. at 659-60.  
 185. Id. at 662. 
 186. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring).  
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decided, lower courts determined an employee to be a minister by 
focusing mainly on the employee’s job duties—namely, if the employee’s 
job duties consisted of “teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, 
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in 
religious ritual and worship,” then the court determined that the employee 
performed a religious function.187 Rather than focusing solely on the 
employee’s job duties, the Hosanna-Tabor Court expanded the 
considerations that courts should evaluate when using the functional 
approach. Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the Court 
considered whether the employee functioned to preach and teach the 
religious organization’s belief and to carry out its mission.188 In 
conclusion, when classifying a religious organization’s employees, courts 
must first consider all the circumstances of the plaintiff’s employment. 
Courts should then determine the plaintiff’s function from those 
circumstances.  
1. The Hosanna-Tabor Court considered all the circumstances 
surrounding the plaintiff’s employment to determine whether the 
employee performed a religious function. 
Although the majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor did not explicitly 
adopt any formal test, each consideration that favored the Hosanna-Tabor 
employee’s classification as a minister was simply a component of most 
employees’ functions. The first consideration—an employee’s formal 
title—generally describes an employee’s function. While there are 
instances where an employee’s title may not relate to the employee’s 
function, an employee’s job title and function generally do correlate. A 
“title” can be defined as “a word or name that describes a person’s job in 
a company or organization.”189 For example, the title of “medical 
assistant” instantly conveys information about the function of such a 
position—namely, to offer medical assistance to another. Similarly, the 
title of “teacher” conveys a function of teaching and instructing,190 and 
the title of “minister” conveys a function of ministering and serving.191  
The second consideration—the substance underlying the title—is 
necessary only when the employee performs some religious function. For 
example, the employee in Hosanna-Tabor underwent significant religious 
 
 187. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).  
 188. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.  
 189. Title, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/title.  
 190. “Teacher” is defined as “one whose occupation is to instruct.” Teacher, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/teacher.  
 191. “Minister” is defined as “to give aid or service.” Minister, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,  
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minister.  
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training to obtain her position—she received an endorsement from her 
local Synod district, passed an examination given by faculty at a Lutheran 
college, and secured the congregation’s election.192 The Hosanna-Tabor 
employee underwent such strenuous requirements because the 
employee’s function was to preach and teach the organization’s beliefs to 
others. Such demanding qualifications would have been unnecessary—
and even pointless—if the employee did not perform some religious 
function.  
The third consideration—the employee’s use of the title—pertains to 
an employee’s function. The Hosanna-Tabor employee held herself out 
to the public as a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service, 
claiming a tax break available only to ministers, and indicating that she 
regarded herself as a minister.193 When employees’ main functions are 
“ministerial,” then such employees would likely hold themselves out to 
the public as such. On the other hand, employees who perform very 
limited “ministerial” functions would likely not hold themselves out to 
the public as a minister. Indeed, it would be strange—and perceptually 
even fraudulent—for employees to outwardly use their title as if they were 
ministers if they performed no religious function.  
The first three considerations in Hosanna-Tabor—the employee’s 
formal title, the substance underlying that title, and the employee’s use of 
that title—are related to the function that the employee performs. Indeed, 
Justices Alito and Kagan’s concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor noted 
that majority’s opinion supported the functional approach: “The Court’s 
opinion today should not be read to upset this [functional approach] 
consensus.”194 And, while concurring opinions are not binding law, in 
some instances, concurrences “may shape the evolution of the law as they 
limit, expand, clarify, or contradict” the majority opinion.195 Sometimes, 
the majority opinion does not contain a clear, easily-extractable legal 
principle, and a concurring opinion can reveal the concurring justices’ 
“understanding of the majority opinion and their preferences regarding 
the particular legal issue.”196 In some cases, lower courts may rely on 
concurring opinions to understand how to apply the majority opinion to 
 
 192. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191.  
 193. Id. at 191-92.  
 194. Id. at 204 (Alito, J., concurring). Justices Alito and Kagan were referring to the consensus 
reached by the lower courts that a religious organization’s employee’s ministerial classification should be 
determined using a functional approach. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 
F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The ‘ministerial exception’ . . . does not depend upon ordination but 
upon the function of the position”); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he ministerial exception encompasses all employees of a religious institution . . . whose primary 
functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission.”) 
 195. PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 5 (Robert 
J. Spitzer ed.,  State University of New York Press 2010).  
 196. Id. at 6.  
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their own cases.197  
The Hosanna-Tabor majority opinion was cautious and vague. The 
opinion gave the lower courts little guidance on how to apply the 
ministerial exception. Instead of applying the four considerations as a 
multi-factor balancing analysis—which explicitly contradicts Justice 
Thomas’s position198—the lower courts should look to the concurring 
opinions in Hosanna-Tabor as clarification of the majority opinion.199 
Indeed, one can see reflections of the concurring opinions in the 
majority’s opinion. For example, Justice Thomas argued that courts 
should completely defer to a religious organization’s determination 
regarding whether its employees qualify as ministers. This deference is 
encompassed by the first consideration in Hosanna-Tabor—the 
employee’s formal title. Because an employee’s formal title is entirely 
decided by the religious organization, the Hosanna-Tabor Court 
displayed the deference that Justice Thomas suggested by considering the 
employee’s formal title as a circumstance that favored a ministerial 
classification.   
Justices Alito and Kagan’s concurring opinion was also incorporated 
into the majority’s considerations. Specifically, Justices Alito and Kagan 
argued that courts should focus on the function that the employee 
performs. The Hosanna-Tabor Court explicitly incorporated the function 
performed by the employee as the fourth consideration in determining that 
the employee qualified as a minister. 
2. A functional approach comports with the purposes of the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 
A functional approach to the ministerial exception facilitates three of 
the purposes of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. First, a 
religious organization must be free to shape its own faith and missions 
through its appointments.200 Second, the Free Exercise Clause protects 
genuine religious freedom, not pretextual or insincere beliefs.201 Third, 
every religious organization—even nontraditional or unpopular ones—
 
 197. Id. at 7.  
 198. Justice Thomas stated: “Judicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of ‘minister’ through a 
bright-line test or multifactor analysis risk disadvantaging those religious organizations whose beliefs, 
practices, and membership are outside of the mainstream or unpalatable to some.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 199. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has construed the concurring opinions in Hosanna-Tabor as 
clarification of the majority’s opinion: “Justices Thomas and Alito each concurred separately to attempt 
to elucidate the application of the ministerial exception.” Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 
169, 174 (5th Cir. 2012).  
 200. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.  
 201. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
1159, 1162 (2013). 
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must be protected.202 The purposes of the Free Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clause would not be satisfied if the first three considerations in  
Hosanna-Tabor were interpreted as separate factors of a test, rather than 
simply as the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff’s employment.  
i. A religious organization must be free to shape its own faith and 
missions through its appointments. 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court held that the Free Exercise Clause prevents 
governmental involvement in “a religious group’s right to shape its own 
faith and mission through its appointments.”203 This overarching purpose 
should be the backdrop against which courts consider whether an 
employee qualifies as a minister. If the disputed employee plays a role in 
shaping the religious organization’s faith or mission, the religious 
organization should not have to follow antidiscrimination laws regarding 
the employment. Because the function that an employee performs directly 
relates to whether the employee has a role in shaping the religious 
organization’s faith or mission, a functional approach to the ministerial 
classification facilitates this purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.  
ii. The Free Exercise Clause protects sincere religious practices. 
Additionally, the Free Exercise Clause protects sincere—not 
pretextual—religious practices.204 If the first three considerations in 
Hosanna-Tabor were interpreted as individual factors of a test, the 
religious organization or the employee could unilaterally—and even 
pretextually—satisfy those factors. For instance, a religious organization 
could bestow a formal religious title on an employee or require significant 
religious training underlying a formal title, simply as a pretense to satisfy 
a factor of the ministerial classification analysis. Also, employees could 
hold themselves out to the public as ministers, entirely for the purpose of 
being classified as ministers—or vice versa. It is contrary to the aim of 
the ministerial exception for religious organizations to invoke a 
ministerial classification, or for religious organizations’ employees to 
avoid a ministerial classification, through a spurious, backdoor approach. 
Rather, the ministerial exception should apply only to the employees of a 
religious organizations who can genuinely be classified as “ministers. 
Additionally, religious organizations should not be forced to comport 
with a rigid framework in order to invoke the ministerial exception. 
 
 202. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”). 
 203. 565 U.S. at 173.  
 204. Paulsen, supra note 197, at 1162.   
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Specifically, religious organizations should not be obligated to confer a 
formal title on their ministers, to impose some substance underlying those 
formal titles, or to compel their ministers to hold themselves out to the 
public as ministers. Rather, the classification of religious organizations’ 
employees should be flexibly based on the naturally occurring, genuine 
circumstances surrounding their employment.   
iii. The Establishment Clause prevents the government from 
disadvantaging nontraditional religious organizations. 
Finally, the Establishment Clause should operate to avoid 
disadvantaging obscure and nontraditional religious organizations.205 The 
functional approach accomplishes this purpose while the four-factor 
analysis applied by Biel does not. If the first consideration in Hosanna-
Tabor—an employee’s formal title—was interpreted as the first factor of 
a multi-factor analysis, that factor would disadvantage nontraditional 
religious organizations. Whether a formal title implies that an employee 
is a “minister” will differ depending on the religious organization. Even 
though “teacher” is a facially secular title, some religious organizations 
use such titles for their minsters. For example, in the Mormon church, the 
formal title of “teacher” can refer to an office in the church’s 
Priesthood.206 Additionally, some religious organizations bestow formal 
titles on their ministers while other religious organizations eschew such 
titles entirely. Similarly, the second consideration in Hosanna-Tabor—
the substance reflected in that title—would disadvantage those religious 
organizations who do not train or recognize a mission underlying their 
ministers’ titles. Finally, the third consideration—whether the employees 
hold themselves out to the public as a minister—could disadvantage those 
organizations that do not allow their ministers to publicly benefit from 
their ministerial status.  
The functional analysis accommodates nontraditional and obscure 
religious organizations. Justices Alito and Kagan identified some general 
functions that are essential to virtually every religious organization, 
however diverse.207 Those religious functions include serving in positions 
of leadership, performing important functions in worship services and 
religious ceremonies, and conveying the religious organization’s faith.208 
Because such functions are imperative to virtually every religious 
organization, classifying employees who perform those functions as 
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“ministers” will not disadvantage nontraditional or obscure religious 
organizations.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
Under a functional approach to the ministerial exception, all teachers 
employed by a religious organization who convey an organization’s 
beliefs should be classified as “ministers.” Justices Alito and Kagan’s 
concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor stated that the First Amendment 
enables religious organizations to engage in the “critical process of 
communicating the faith.”209 Further, the Justices argued that the 
ministerial exception should apply to any employee who “serves as a 
messenger or teacher” of a religious organization’s faith.210 Additionally, 
the Justices noted that conveying the faith to the next generation is an 
essential function to the freedom of practically all religious organizations, 
and that the messenger certainly matters when it comes to the inculcation 
of religious doctrine because the credibility of a religion’s message often 
depends on the character and conduct of its teachers.211 
Recently, a study was conducted to investigate the influences on 
students’ values in the academic setting.212 The study examined whether, 
during a semester, university students’ values were influenced by their 
professors’ values.213 At the beginning and again at the end of the 
semester, students answered a questionnaire surveying their religious and 
political preferences.214  
The study found that, during the semester, the students assimilated their 
values to their professors’ values for values-based215 classes.216 Most 
notably, the study revealed that professors’ impact on students’ religiosity 
was the most consistent and robust finding.217 Specifically, the more the 
professors valued religion, the more the students valued religion.218 
Conversely, if the professors did not value religion, then the students’ 
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 214. Id. at 161-62.  
 215. In this study, a values-based class meant that “the purpose of the course was to discuss values-
based topics (e.g., human rights, spiritual beliefs).” Id. at 164. A “value” was defined as “internalized 
cognitive structure that guides decision making by establishing basic principles of right and wrong, a sense 
of priorities, meaning, and patterns.” Id. at 158.  
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value of religion decreased.219 In sum, the magnitude and direction of 
change in the students’ values were influenced by their professor’s level 
of religiosity.220  
The findings of this study bolster the points made in Justices Alito and 
Kagan’s concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor. The study suggests that 
if a religious organization employs a teacher to convey its beliefs, the 
teacher’s effectiveness in imparting the organization’s values depends, at 
least in part, on the teacher’s own values. A religious organization 
possesses a critical interest in effectively imparting the organization’s 
beliefs to others. Therefore, to preserve complete religious freedom, all 
religious teachers should qualify as “ministers” for purposes of the 
exception.  
Additionally, the study revealed that students assimilated their values 
to their professors’ values for non-values-based221 classes, too.222 
Although Justices Alito and Kagan’s concurring opinion in Hosanna-
Tabor stated that “a purely secular teacher would not qualify” for the 
ministerial exception,223 the study’s finding suggests that a teacher who 
teaches nonreligious subjects at a religious organization’s school might 
qualify as a minister for purposes of the exception. Perhaps as new studies 
come out and demonstrate the effect that every teacher has on students’ 
religious values, the analysis might change on that front. 
The Supreme Court caused unnecessary confusion by issuing an 
extremely narrow and undefined holding in Hosanna-Tabor—the only 
case the Supreme Court has ever heard involving the ministerial 
exception. Religious organizations and their employees deserve 
predictability and certainty regarding liability for adverse employment 
decisions. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt any rigid 
test, the functional approach is consistent with the Court’s holding in 
Hosanna-Tabor and comports with the purposes of the First Amendment. 
Therefore, lower courts should use a functional analysis when classifying 
religious organizations’ employees for the purposes of the ministerial 
exception. 
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